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Abstract
After almost a decade of passivity, Russian workers are once again striking. For the ﬁrst
time since the 1990s, labor unrest has spread across the country, aﬀecting foreign and domestic
investors, well-to-do industrial and natural-resource enterprises and infrastructural installa-
tions. But unlike in the 1990s, these strikes have accompanied an economic boom, suggesting
that patterns of Russian labor unrest are beginning to resemble those in other countries.
Analysis of several recent strikes, meanwhile, suggests the early emergence of a new labor
proto-movement, characterized by feelings of entitlement and injustice that stem in part from
government rhetoric, while pushed into opposition by the state’s refusal to accommodate
genuine labor mobilization.
 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.
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For the ﬁrst time since the ‘‘Rail Wars’’ of the late 1990s, Russian workers are
making national and international news. While the foreign media have focused on
strikes at Ford Motor Company near St. Petersburg, and on the Moscow rail system,
a broader wave of strikes has been gaining momentum in a range of industries across
Russia. In sectors as diﬀerent as paper processing, mining and transportation, and in
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cities large and small, strikes have been occurring at an apparently accelerating pace.
In this article we analyze the current wave of strikes, putting it in the context of
previous strikes in post-Communist Russia and in the broader context of strike
patterns in the economies of developing countries. We make two central claims.
First, the current strike wave is signiﬁcant, less for its size than for the fact that it
represents important changes in the nature of strikes and labor representation in
Russia: speciﬁcally, Russia’s strikes are undergoing ‘normalization’ both in terms of
timing and targeting, reﬂecting a greater degree of institutionalization of Russia’s
state and economy than in the past. Second, we argue that the strike wave matters as
a potential challenge to the managed and monopolized system of political interest
representation that has been constructed in Russia over the last decade, including
but not limited to labor relations.
Since at least 2006, a rash of strikes has been spreading across Russia. Just how
serious the ‘‘rash’’ is, is hard to tell. Oﬃcial data record only ‘‘legal’’ strikes, and
since a judge can be found to rule most industrial actions ‘‘illegal,’’ only a handful of
strikes are recorded each year: a mere eight were reported in 2007. However, it seems
clear there is much more strike activity than the authorities are willing to recognize.
Data collected by the Institute of Collective Action identiﬁed at least 35 strikes in
2007, with the longest lasting 3 weeks (www.ikd.ru). Moreover, the pace and
intensity of strike activity seems to be increasing. A survey of events reported to the
international trade union website LABOURSTART in April of 2008 identiﬁed more
than 25 separate strikes or hunger strikes in progress in that month alone. While the
recent wave of strikes is still small when compared within the strike waves of the late
1980s and 1997e1999, it is undoubtedly the most substantial mobilization of
Russian workers since the beginning of the Putin era. Moreover, in this article we
argue that the strike wave of 2007e2008 heralds signiﬁcant changes both in strike
patterns themselves and in the nature of labor representation.
In terms of strike patterns, contemporary Russian strikes, while still thoroughly
grounded in national context and informed by local meaning, are beginning to bear
more resemblance to strike patterns in both developing and OECD countries. Seven
decades of Communism and two decades of post-Communism in Russia meant that
the country lacked both a market economy and a functioning state, both of which
have shaped industrial relations elsewhere. As a result, patterns of labor protest in
Russia in the immediate post-Communist period were quite diﬀerent from those
found outside the former Soviet Union, both in the nature and timing of strikes and
in the relationship between strikes and patterns of labor mobilization. However, the
new rash of strikes suggests that this may be changing.
In most economies, whether in the OECD or in developing countries, strikes tend
to be ‘‘pro-cyclical’’, in that there are more strikes in economic upswings and fewer
in downturns (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969). By contrast, strikes in post-
Communist Russia had, until recently, been ‘‘counter-cyclical’’, common during
economic crisis and largely absent during periods of growth. However, as we will
show, contemporary strikes in Russia are now more the result of rising expectations
in a growing economy, rather than the product of economic decline. Workers are
increasingly conscious of the proﬁts being made by ﬁrms in the boom of the 2000s,
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and so many of the strikes in contemporary Russia are typical ‘‘business cycle’’
strikes, in which workers seek to take advantage of the greater bargaining power
over employers given to them by a growing economy and tighter labor markets.
While there are still strikes centered on demands for unpaid wages in failing enter-
prises, the majority of the new strikes involve demands for improvements in wages
and working conditions, couched in terms of justice and entitlements. Important,
too, in the current wave of strikes is the role of inﬂation, which is eating away at real
living standards even as the overall economy grows. Rising prices are one of the most
frequently cited complaints amongst strikers in Russia today.
In addition, strike patterns in most countries have historically been quite closely
tied to underlying patterns of labor organization, with strikes tending to be more
common when representative labor organizations are establishing themselves
(Snyder, 1977). Previously, patterns of strikes in Russia had been more inﬂuenced by
local wildcat (non-union) actions or by patterns of elite political relations rather than
by independent labor organizing (Robertson, 2007). Again, the new wave of strikes
provides evidence that this may be changing. The highly politicized strikes of the
1980s and 1990s seem to be giving way to strikes that are largely about economics
and relations between employees and employers. The state is still, of course, an
important player in strikes, as it is in strikes in all market economies, but in most
cases it is no longer a primary or even a key player in the individual disputes.
Another major development, we argue, is that along with rising expectations there
is a growing tendency for workers to demand genuinely representative labor unions.
While so-called ‘‘alternative’’ unions have long been a feature of labor politics in the
post-Communist period, they appear now to be emerging from a period of stagna-
tion and are once again asserting themselves, in response to pressure from below
from workers. Despite a Labor Code that stacks the deck heavily against them,
Russian workers are demanding a voice and doing the diﬃcult work of forcing
employers and the government to listen.
None of this, of course, is to suggest that there is any normative compulsion or
analytical beneﬁt to an insistence on convergence with Western models of labor
mobilization and industrial relations. Rather, our suggestion here is that there are
aspects of the new wave of strikes that ﬁt more naturally into global, comparative
contexts than did the strikes of the 1990s, which were more uniquely Russian
(though not entirely). The context we refer to, moreover, is not speciﬁcally Western
(and even the Western modes of industrial relations diﬀer signiﬁcantly from country
to country), but includes the experience of other post-communist transition coun-
tries, as well as Latin American and other developing countries.
Furthermore, to the extent that Russian labor activists seek to establish a more
‘European’model of industrial relations, they still have a long way to go. Rights to free
collective bargaining and organization are abridged both in law and, even more so, in
practice. Labor relations in Russia are still marked by authoritarianism. Despite the
new-found energy of the alternative unions, trade unionism at theworkplace and at the
regional and national levels is still dominated by Communist-era successor unions in
the so-called Federatsiia Nezavisimykh Profsoiuzov Rossii (Federation of Independent
LaborUnionsofRussia, orFNPR) (Gritsenko et al., 1999).With aquasi-monopoly on
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representation guaranteed by the Labor Code of 2001, FNPR unions are para-statal
organizations intended to manage workers rather than represent them. Nevertheless,
we argue here that the current wave of strikes helps to highlight for workers the
essentially repressive role that the FNPR plays, and so is putting the FNPR under
considerable pressure to transform itself into a more representative body e pressure
that the FNPR has thus far vehemently resisted.
The second major implication of Russia’s new round of strikes, we argue, is that
these strikes may represent the beginnings of a challenge to the managed and
monopolized model of interest representation developed under Putin. Management
of the system is predicated on general acceptance by workers of the organizations
permitted by the state to represent them. If the state is not able to keep up with the
growing expectations of workers and with its own promises, acceptance of the
legitimacy of the dominant institutions might disappear and the project of managing
society from above could be put in jeopardy.
The article is organized in ﬁve sections. We begin by reviewing the nature of strike
patterns in the post-Communist period in Russia, highlighting the unusual nature of
strike patterns in this period. We then analyze the new strike wave, looking in turn at
each of its key elements: strikes in foreign-owned enterprises, in proﬁtable Russian-
owned enterprises, in transportation and the public sector and in failing enterprises.
In the third and fourth sections we move on to analyze the emerging changes in labor
representation, looking ﬁrst at the reemergence of alternative labor unions and then
at the response of the oﬃcial unions. Finally, we consider the implications of the
strike wave for Russia’s system of interest representation, by looking at how the
Russian state’s promises have rebounded in the form of demands for economic
justice that are diﬃcult to integrate within the prevailing institutions governing labor
relations.
Post-Communism and the strike
There has been quite a cottage industry of studies looking at strikes, protest
patterns and politics in post-Communism, and in Russia in particular. While
workers played a major role in the Soviet collapse (Crowley, 1997), the conventional
wisdom was that there has been no industrial protest of note in post-Communist
Russia. David Mandel asks, ‘‘Why is there no revolt?’’ (Mandel, 2001). Sarah
Ashwin analyzes ‘‘The Anatomy of Patience’’ (Ashwin, 1999), Paul Kubicek
examines ‘‘worker passivity in the face of severe economic crisis’’ (Kubicek, 2002,
p. 618) and Kaspar Richter notes ‘‘the absence of any sustained protest movement’’
(Richter, 2006, p. 134).
However, Robertson (2007) demonstrates that there has been considerable vari-
ation in the extent to which Russian workers have been mobilized in the post-
Communist era. While many workers were indeed passive in the Yeltsin years, others
were, in fact, highly mobilized. On the other hand, the image of generalized passivity
seems to apply better to the early Putin years. In this section we review this history
and, in particular, look at the eclipse of alternatives to the Soviet successor unions in
the early Yeltsin years. This meant that when strikes did emerge they were either
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largely wildcat actions born of desperation, or were actions coordinated from above
by regional leaders seeking to inﬂuence the center. Both of these elements have made
strike patterns in post-Communist Russia highly unusual from an international
perspective.
In July 1989 organized labor burst onto the Soviet political scene in an unprec-
edented and dramatic fashion as 400,000 miners, from the Ukrainian Donbas,
through the Karaganda coalﬁelds of Kazakhstan, to the Sakhalin mines of the
Russian Far East, went on strike. The 1989 strikes represented a turning point of
enormous signiﬁcance and were followed by the creation of a genuine grassroots
workers’ movement in the coalﬁelds of the Soviet Union. From 1989 to 1991, this
movement came to play a signiﬁcant role in the politics of the disintegration of the
USSR through an alliance struck between the miners on the one side, and Boris
Yeltsin on the other (Ilyin, 1999).1 However, once control of the mines was passed
from the Soviet government to that of the Russian Federation, it soon became clear
that the majority of the mines simply could not survive without state support and the
interests of the miners and Yeltsin’s shock-therapists diverged (Ilyin, 1999, p. 252).
The story of the miners’ unions is closely mirrored by other new unions in the
post-Soviet period. The most prominent of these was a confederation of unions
known as Sotsprof. An oﬀshoot of the Social Democratic Party, Sotsprof provided
an umbrella for newly emerging local unions, and represented workers in a number
of areas, most notably in the budget sector. In the dying days of the USSR, Sotsprof
and the Social Democrats were useful to Yeltsin and he turned control over the
Russian Ministry of Labor to the Social Democrats in 1991. However, like
the miners, the Social Democrats were rapidly isolated by both the neo-liberals in the
Yeltsin administration and the forces representing industrial interests, and they
disappeared oﬀ all but the most detailed maps of the Russian political landscape.
As the Yeltsin administration began to co-opt powerful industrial interests in
1992 and 1993, it also moved closer to the leaders of the Soviet successor unions in
the renamed FNPR. While Yeltsin personally may have had little time for Soviet-era
dinosaurs like the FNPR, his government recognized the potential advantages of
making the FNPR its main partner in labor relations. After all, the government’s
economic reform agenda seemed likely to lead to the closure of many enterprises
and, as the successor to the all-encompassing Soviet trade union confederation, the
FNPR had a broad reach into practically every workplace opened before 1991. It
would be the FNPR’s job to manage any potential unrest that might arise.
Though oﬃcially opposed to the government, the FNPR found the incentives to
cooperate with the government to be very strong. The union had inherited 31 million
members and billions of dollars worth of property from its Soviet predecessor, and
Yeltsin could have taken all this away with the stroke of a pen. This made the FNPR
an excellent partner for the government, enormously vulnerable and dependent upon
the ongoing favor of the administration.
1 The origins of this alliance are the subject of some dispute. For opposing views see Clarke et al., 1993,
p. 161e2, and Crowley, 1997, p. 123.
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Deliberately excluded by this deal were Russia’s workers. The cooptation of the
major unions, combined with economic, social and political collapse, left them
largely demobilized and usually unable to overcome the enormous obstacles to
collective action that they faced. In a few isolated sectors, such as dockers and air-
traﬃc controllers, independent unions were able to establish themselves, but for the
most part Russian workers were either unrepresented, or were in unions intended to
manage rather than mobilize them.
Nevertheless, the second Yeltsin term saw the emergence of large waves of strikes
across Russia, largely as a result of economic crisis and the collapse of the system of
payments and governmental transfers. Even according to conservative oﬃcial
statistics, Russia had 111 workings days per 1000 workers lost to strikes in 1997 and
56.1 in 1998. This compares to 3 and 4, respectively, in what Ekiert and Kubik (2001)
call ‘‘rebellious Poland’’ (Robertson, 2007, p. 784). Moreover, these oﬃcial statistics
are likely to greatly understate the level of protest. Internal Russian government
data, for example, suggest that the 1998 ﬁgure could be almost twice as large as the
published numbers.
Whatever the size of the strikes in the late 1990s, they were widespread across
diﬀerent sectors of the economy. Most prominent in the media among the strikers of
this period were the miners who took to blocking railroads and who occupied the
Gorbatyi Most in Moscow during the summer of 1998. However, in terms of
numbers the leading role in this wave was taken by budget sector workers such as
teachers and healthcare workers who made up almost half of the days lost to strikes
in 1997 and 1998. Yet the strike wave went considerably beyond these two highly
publicized groups, with about a quarter of all strikes taking place in non-mining
industry, and fully 16 percent in the machine building sector, which includes the
manufacture of cars, trucks, ships, industrial equipment and the like.
From an international perspective, the strikes of the Yeltsin era were quite
unusual. Unlike most strikes in market economies, these were not workers chal-
lenging working conditions or wages. Nor were they, for the most part, workers
ﬁghting to defend threatened jobs. Instead, more than 95 percent of strikes were
about unpaid wages, legally owed by employers. Though unemployment remained
surprisingly low during the economic collapse of the mid-1990s, unpaid wages to
workers in Russia amounted to some R22 billion in the ﬁrst quarter of 1996 (some 71
percent of the monthly wage bill) and rose to R38.7 billion (or 114 percent of the
monthly wage bill) by the end of that year (Desai and Idson, 2001, p. 47).2 As the
decade continued the problem of unpaid wages grew even more serious. By
September 29, 1999, the total debt on wages had reached more than R56 billion, with
more than 17 million workers at 107,000 enterprises not being paid on time.
In some places, like Khakasiia, Primorskii Krai, and Kemerovo, regional political
authorities and the unions embraced the workers’ case, and huge strike waves took
place pressuring the central government for intervention to solve the wages crisis.
However, this only happened in places where local elites had poor relations with
2 Amounts are converted into new rubles for ease of comparison.
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Moscow, and there never emerged a well organized, coordinated campaign across
the country (Robertson, 2007). Instead, protests were numerous but isolated and
mainly local in nature. Nearly half of Russia’s regions, including the most important
places like Moscow and St. Petersburg, saw virtually no strike activity at all.
In those places where strikes did take place, they were more born of desperation
and a sense of moral outrage than out of any real expectation of success. Many of
the strikes in industry were in enterprises that were not proﬁtable anyway and
cutting production did little to harm employers. Strikes in public services such as
education and health also seemed to have little eﬀect, largely because chronic under-
funding meant that these institutions could no longer usefully employ all those on
the payroll.
Frustration with the ineﬀectiveness of strikes led many to resort to more direct
actions. These came in two primary categories: eﬀorts to impose costs on the state,
and those that inﬂicted costs on the protesters themselves. The former are most
famously exempliﬁed in Russia by the so-called ‘‘rail wars.’’ During the spring and
summer of 1998, the tactic of blocking major rail connections across Russia, and in
particular the Trans-Siberian railroad, had become so common that on May 20,
1998 Interior Ministry (MVD, Ministerstvo Vnutrinykh Del ) oﬃces in the provinces
began enumerating rail blockades in a separate section of their reports to Moscow
(as they already did with strikes and hunger strikes). Although the ‘‘rail wars’’ are
most often associated with coal miners, and the miners of the western Siberian
province of Kemerovo in particular, other workers in sectors that depended directly
on the Federal government were also involved.
The other common form of direct action taken by workers was to harm them-
selves and cast the moral blame on the government. In at least 30 cases reported by
the MVD, this action took the ultimate form of public self-immolation or suicide.
There were also reports of self-maiming that would appear periodically as diﬀerent
people took extreme measures to publicize their fate. Much more common, however,
was the announcement of a hunger strike. Indeed, more than 840 diﬀerent hunger
strikes took place in Russia between 1997 and 2000.
The frequent resort to hunger strikes is a clear sign both of the desperation and of
the atomization of Russia’s workers in the 1990s. Hunger strikes have long been
a weapon of choice for those with no other means to exert pressure than their own
moral suasion. Prisoners, for example, have often taken to hunger strikes to publi-
cize their demands either for improvements in conditions, to claim political status for
their incarceration, or to draw attention to broader political causes in the name of
which they felt they were being jailed. In Russia, there is a strong tradition of hunger
striking prisoners that stretches at least from the Decembrists of the 1820s through
Stalin’s Gulag, to Brezhnev era dissidents. What is interesting is the adoption of the
tactics of the incarcerated by workers. This is indicative of the sense of powerlessness
and desperation felt by many Russians who suﬀered from the ﬁscal crisis of the
Russian state and economy more generally in the second half of the 1990s.
By the time Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the strike wave of the Yeltsin
era was already over. The number of marches and rallies recorded each month by the
MVD fell from a peak of 160 per month in March of 1999, to 46 in August, 25 in
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October and a mere 20 in December. Strike levels, which had peaked at 196 strikes
per month in November of 1998, also fell rapidly. The month of September 1999 saw
only 31 strikes in the MVD reports, traditionally troublesome October only 32
strikes, and December only 40. In 2000, no more than 450,000 working days were
lost to strikes in the whole country. Moreover, as Putin’s ﬁrst term went on the level
of strikes and protests seem to have dropped oﬀ further. Oﬃcial data for 2000 show
817 strikes taking place that year, 291 in 2001, 80 in 2002 and only 67 in 2003. This
general trend in the oﬃcial data is supported by anecdotal evidence. Thus, just as
economic growth was really taking oﬀ in Russia, and labor markets were tightening,
circumstances that elsewhere produced major increases in strike activity, strikes in
Russia were declining rapidly.
Nevertheless, consolidating control over labor and the unions was one of the ﬁrst
priorities of the new regime. The result was a new Labor Code passed with FNPR
support in 2001 that substantially reduced workers’ rights, while squeezing out
alternative unions and consolidating the quasi-monopoly of the FNPR. Three
elements of the reform stood out that really hurt the alternative unions (Ashwin and
Clarke, 2003, p. 114). First, in order to be recognized to take part in the negotiation
of a collective agreement at the enterprise level, a union must be a primary orga-
nization of an all-Russian trade union. This is problematic for unions that are
essentially local in character, as most of the alternatives are, having emerged from
local conﬂicts or strike committees rather than being part of a broader national
movement.
More damaging is a second provision that requires that all unions create a joint
negotiating team within a period of 5 days where more than one union is present in
an enterprise. In the absence of such an agreement the majority union takes
responsibility for negotiations. This means the FNPR aﬃliate can simply exclude
competitors by not talking with them.
Third, the Labor Code requires that, in order to be legal, strikes need to be
conﬁrmed by a majority vote of a meeting attended by two-thirds of the entire labor
force of an enterprise. This makes it very diﬃcult for many alternative unions that
only represent a particular group or section of workers within an enterprise to
organize a legal strike.3
Taken together, these elements created a system for governing labor relations that
gave the FNPR a central role in the management of dissent and in channeling
workers away from strikes in particular, and independent organizing in general. For
several years this system delivered the kind of industrial peace for which it was
designed. Nevertheless, despite the restrictions, a range of wildcat, often illegal,
strikes have recently broken out across Russia. In the next section, we review in more
detail some key strikes that illustrate the broad range of the strike wave and some
key lessons.
3 Alternative unions have long had trouble undertaking legal strikes. In an interview with the author in
November 2000, President of Sotsprof, Sergei Vladimirovich Khramov claimed that of approximately 100
court cases per year challenging the legality of strikes, over 80 percent of the cases concerned Sotsprof.
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The strikes of 2006e2008
In this section we analyze some key elements of the strike wave that has taken
place in Russia in the last few years. We look in turn at each of the most important
elements, focusing on strikes in foreign-owned enterprises, in prosperous and prof-
itable Russian-owned enterprises, in the transportation and budget sector, and
ﬁnally in struggling Russian enterprises. We describe the main outlines of strikes in
each of these areas, showing how many of the features of the new strikes are diﬀerent
from those of the 1990s, illustrating the important role played by emulation, and
showing how this contemporary wave of strikes has been inﬂuenced both by the
continued economic growth that Russia experienced until 2008 and by patterns of
independent labor organizing.
Foreign-owned enterprises
The most high proﬁle among the recent wave of strikes have taken place at foreign-
owned companies such as Ford’s plant in Vsevolozhsk near St. Petersburg and
Renault’s Avtoframos plant in Moscow. Other foreign-owned plants outside the car
industry have also been the site of strikes or protest actions, including the Nestle plant
in Perm’, the Coca-Cola and Heineken plants in St. Petersburg and Leroy Merlin
Vostok inMytishchi, where workers have been demonstrating in defense of their right
to form a union aﬃliated with the alternative union federation Torgovoe Edinstvo.
The fact that the Russian labor movement is reemerging in foreign plants is one
aspect in which the latest strike wave resembles labor relations in other emerging
market economies. Foreign direct investment is often associated with high proﬁle
strikes or labor organizing campaigns in the developing world, and this is particularly
true in countries like Russia that do not enjoy high levels of political democracy or
well-developed systems of workers’ rights and labor relations (Robertson and Tei-
telbaum, 2009). Why this should be the case is not completely clear, but there are
a number of possibilities. It may be that workers feel safer or more protected in
challenging foreign employers who have weaker political connections and cover than
a prominent domestic employer might have. Similarly, it may be that union organizers
think that foreign employers are more likely to feel constrained in their reactions to
organizing drives, fearing negative international publicity. Alternatively, it might be
the case that workers feel that foreign employers in multi-national corporations have
deeper pockets and so are a ‘‘softer target’’ that will be more likely to respond to
demands. Whether for these or some other reasons, for a labor movement that is
struggling to establish itself in diﬃcult circumstances, foreign-owned enterprises might
be a relatively protected place to begin. In Russia, the Ford Motor Co. plant in
Vsevolozhsk, outside of St. Petersburg, has played a major role in this process.
Ford
The Ford plant in Vsevolozhsk has been home to a small labor union since the
plant was opened in July 2002. Initially aﬃliated with FNPR, the union started small
and grew slowly, counting only 113 members by the summer of 2005. That summer,
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though, the company sent union leader Aleksei Etmanov and a colleague to
a seminar for Ford union leaders in Brazil, where their eyes were opened to the
possibilities of labor mobilization. The Russian union leaders gathered some ideas,
joined together with colleagues in other countries in a Transnational Information
Exchange network and learned that Ford was planning to increase output at Vse-
volozhsk but had no plans to increase salary. That led to the ﬁrst strike (Vishnevski,
2005). Workers at the Vsevolozhsk plant ﬁrst threatened to strike in September 2005
and, on November 2, held an hour-long warning strike, demanding increased wages
(Shevchenko, 2005a; Vremia i Den’gi, 2005). Later that month, Etmanov’s union
held a week-long ‘Italian strike’, after their September demands were ignored,
although management expressed its willingness to continue negotiating with the
union (Shevchenko, 2005b). Eventually, Ford was forced to deal with the union and
sign a collective bargaining agreement (Viktorov, 2007).
That was only the beginning. In early 2006, the union announced plans for a full-
scale strike to protest what workers saw as a lack of improvement in relations with
management, although they backed oﬀ when a court banned the strike in April of
that year (Shevchenko, 2006). At around the same time, the FNPR kicked the Ford
union out of the Federation for ‘extremism’ (Frolov, 2007). By the time a new round
of collective bargaining began in early 2007, though, the union had regrouped,
holding a protest on February 8 to complain that management was not negotiating
in good faith (Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2007a). They were joined by port, railroad and
electricity workers, as well as activists from the Communist Party and other left-wing
parties and political groups (Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2007b). Gennadii Ziuganov, leader
of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF, by its Russian acronym)
came to the picket line, ‘‘cursing the bourgois for exploitation of the working
masses’’. The next morning, Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov expressed
his solidarity but spoke mostly about pensions, which were of little interest to the
workers, whose average age at Ford is 25 (Butuzova, 2007). Eventually, the sides
reached a salary agreement that was seen widely as a victory for the union.
Claiming that Ford was failing to live up to its obligations in the February
agreement, workers began an open-ended strike on November 20, 2007. An earlier
strike planned for Nov. 7 had been declared illegal by a Leningrad Oblast court and
the new strike was allowed only after the union agreed to maintain a minimum level
of activity at the factory. Meanwhile, workers at the Renault Avtoframos factory in
Moscow held a rally in support of the striking workers at Ford (Samarskie Izvestiia,
2007). The workers demanded an increase in pay of at least 33% and a shortened
night shift (Vecherniaia Moskva, 2007). In addition to pay demands, however,
workers were upset about perceived inequality, with middle managers reportedly
earning some 200,000 rubles per month, compared to less than 20,000 rubles for the
average worker (Pozdnyakova, 2007). Some 1500 workers took part in the strike,
demanding pay raises from 1 March 2008 (Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2007c). The walkout
lasted only 3 days, but was followed by a smaller action involving only key workers
(Bychina and Shevchuk, 2007). In January 2008, the workers and the company
agreed to a new collective bargain, including pay raises ranging from 16 to 21% and
a range of other bonuses (Bychina, 2008; Shevchuk et al., 2008).
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The success of the Ford strikes resonated elsewhere, both in the region and in the
industry. Thus, in a copycat action, dockworkers at the St. Petersburg seaport struck
in December 2007, even as Ford was struggling to piece together shifts from non-
striking workers in mid-December (Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, 2007). And in
response to the November 2007 strikes at Ford, management at AvtoVAZ in
Tol’iatti held meetings with its independent union Edinstvo e despite earlier refusing
to recognize it e and agreed to include a Edinstvo representative in collective bar-
gaining (Yur’eva, 2007). For its part, the Edinstvo union said it would use the Ford
result as grounds for seeking higher salaries (Shevchenko, 2007).
Despite its general tactic of dealinge if not always willinglyewith the union, Ford
worked to mobilize the local government to its defense, which accused Etmanov’s
union of playing politics. Thus, district government head Igor’ Samokhin said:
The European management of the plant is proposing good conditions to the
workers. The problem is with the trade union leadership, whose ambitions are
endless. Their inﬂuence over the workers is such that even those who,
according to management information, were not planning on participating in
the strike crumbled and supported the majority (Shevchenko, 2007).
After the November 2007 strikes, Ford attempted unsuccessfully to ﬁre
Etmanov. Similarly measures have been attempted against independent labor
leaders at Heineken and the Russian Post (Bychina and Shevchuk, 2008).
Russian-owned enterprises
Strikes, protests, and the emergence of new unions are far from being limited,
however, to foreign-owned companies. In fact, strikes have taken place in some of
the crown-jewels of Russian industry, including in the oil and gas sector, in mineral
extraction and in Russian manufacturing plants. In this section we review three of
the most prominent strikes in these areas; Surgutneftegaz, AvtoVAZ and the Red
Riding Hood coal mine. These strikes illustrate the emergence of independent
organization among workers in successful Russian-owned enterprises (as well as the
authorities’ eﬀorts to suppress it), the change in the nature of the demands of
Russian workers to wage increases and better working conditions, and the adoption
of justice frames based on social responsibility to make these demands.
Surgutneftegaz
Unrest at Surgutneftegaz (SNG) e one of Russia’s largest remaining private oil
companies e began in July 2006, when workers struck for unpaid salary, picketing
the corporate oﬃce and compelling the regional prosecutor to intervene and force
management to pay back wages (Zav’ialova, 2006). The protest grew, however, and
by the middle of the month as many as 1500 workers took to the streets, demanding
increased and restructured salaries and improved treatment by management
(Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2006). The action spread quickly, with a 3000-person picket in
the nearby oil town of Liantor e likewise an SNG town e by the end of the month,
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and then renewed protests in October in Surgut, Liantor, Megion and Nizhne-
vartovsk, all key Siberian oil towns (Nikolaeva et al., 2006; Titov, 2006).
The protests were organized by Profsvoboda, an independent union aﬃliated with
Sotsprof and led by Surgut crane operator Aleksandr Zakharkin (Gazeta, 2007). The
2006 strikes and protests involved Profsvoboda cells at seven SNG units in Surgut
and other cities (Nikolaeva et al., 2006). Signiﬁcant support was provided by the
KPRF, whose Surgut oﬃce served as strike headquarters and whose local leader,
Sergei Deryabin, took on the tasks of obtaining protest permits and managing
relations with the media and the police (Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2006).
As Profsvoboda began building momentum for the strikes, SNG tried ﬁrst to head
them oﬀ by promising a pay raise, although the oﬀer e on average, 1000 rubles per
person per month e proved insuﬃciently attractive. Next, the company tried intimi-
dation, spreading rumors that participating workers would be identiﬁed and ﬁred
(SovetskaiaRossiia, 2006).After theworkers nonethelesswent aheadwith the protests,
SNG CEO Vladimir Bogdanov announced that he would negotiate but only through
the oﬃcial FNPR union, Neftegazstroiprofsoiuz (Oil and Gas Construction Labor
Union, NGSP). This, too, backﬁred, reportedly leading to a mass exodus of NGSP
members to Profsvoboda. A new salary oﬀer, on the other hand, proved to be more
eﬀective, with workers seeing increases of 10%e52% (with the largest raises coming in
Liantor, which had seen the largest protests) (Nikolaeva et al., 2006).
To ensure that the events of the summer and autumn of 2006 did not repeat
themselves, by the end of 2006 SNG management had come together with the local
authorities, loyal media outlets and the FNPR unions to undermine and marginalize
Profsvoboda, locking the independent union out of negotiations and calling into
question the independent union’s motives and ﬁnancing, calling them ‘radicals’ and
suggesting that they were serving or being manipulated by outside forces (Kopnov,
2006). Bogdanov, citing the involvement of the KPRF, accused the Communists of
provoking the strike for political purposes (Nikolaeva et al., 2006). Sergei Lepilin,
head of the FNPR aﬃliate at the Russian-British joint venture TNK-BP, which had
been hit in the October 2006 protests organized by Profsvoboda and its Sotsprof
allies, told the regional newspaper Novosti Yugry, ‘‘We know about these problems
and are working to solve them. But demonstrations e that is no way to go about it’’
(Titov, 2006). And in another local newspaper, NGSP representative V. Bykov
delivered the following invective:
It is not by chance that they use Soviet-era language e the cult of the working
man is still alive in our memories, and that’s where the urge of radical trade
union leaders to break or smash the employer comes from. This urge, as we
have seen, ﬁres up the left-radical political parties (which is understandable), as
well as the right-wing radicals (by which I mean Sotsprof, with which their
Profsvoboda is associated). These radicals have their own goals e to achieve the
same situation in labor relations as exists in the West. For them the working
man is just cannon fodder (Bykov, 2007).
For good measure, a key Profsvoboda leader in Surgut, Aleksandr Sokolov, was
severely beaten (Kukolevskii, 2007).
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Early in 2007, meanwhile, FNPR and its aﬃliate NGSP attempted to gain back
some of their lost credibility, leading workers in Surgut out into the streets in
January and February to demand higher wages (Gorshkova, 2007), and mobilizing
regional workers again in April of that year as part of a nationwide rally for
increased pensions. Profsvoboda, however, demonstratively refused to take part.
Citing FNPR’s formal partnership arrangement with ruling political party Edinaia
Rossiia, Zakharkin said at the time: ‘‘We don’t see any sense in participating in this
event, because the FNPR is completely under the control of the authorities. The
recent campaign to raise pensions is populist and bears the hallmark of an election
campaign stunt’’ (Kozenko, 2007).
AvtoVAZ
Independent trade unionism at the massive AvtoVAZ plant in Tol’iatti has had
a shaky history. The main independent union, Edinstvo, burst onto the scene in 1996,
when a strike it organized shut down the plant for two weeks and led to the
resumption of full, on-time payment of salaries. At its peak, the union had 3500
members. But by 2007, however, that ﬁgure had fallen to somewhere between 600
and 1500, by various estimates (Krylov, 2007). Nevertheless, with one eye on
developments in Vsevolozhsk, workers at AvtoVAZ were perhaps in a combative
mood when, on July 1, 2007, employees of several shops received notices that their
base salary would be cut to 6000 rubles a month, with further earnings to come from
overtime and bonuses. Angry workers gathered for a meeting, wrote several
collective letters and began an Italian strike on July 9, lasting for a week (Speranskii,
2007). In mid-July, workers at three VAZ shops demanded pay increases to 25,000
rubles per month, and they struck again for 3 h on August 1, 2007, with some 400
workers from three shops taking part (Bondarenko, 2007). The demand for 25,000
ruble salaries was seen as a reaction to the ruling party Edinaia Rossiia’s own election
campaign slogan ‘‘25 thousand rubles a month e its real’’ (Mekhanik and Kvasov,
2007). Edinstvo repeated the protest again on September 19, with 500e600 protes-
tors. According to Petr Zolotarev, leader of the independent Edinstvo union at VAZ,
the August 1 strike forced management to start negotiations, although management
deny any connection between the strike and negotiations (Kaledin, 2007).
The primary reaction of AvtoVAZ management e led by representatives of
Rosoboronexport, the military-industrial holding that owns the company e was
pressure. Prior to the August 1 strike, in late July, Zolotarev complained that VAZ,
together with law enforcement, were trying to prevent the strike by putting pressure
on Edinstvo and its activists, including the arrest of Anton Vechkunin and Mikhail
Doronin, who were distributing union literature, and the accusation of ‘extremism’.
In addition, by some reports, two strikers were ﬁred and approximately 200 were
docked pay after the August 1 strike (Petrov, 2007). Outrage at these actions was
a major factor in contributing to the September protest (Malinin, 2007). United
Civic Front opposition activist Marina Litvinovich compared the reaction to
the VAZ strikes to that faced by the Dissenters’ Marches, saying ‘‘The methods the
authorities are using at VAZ are identical to the ones used against participants in
the Dissenters’ Marches; the technology of preventing actions and of isolation
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leaders and activists. They also tried to accuse the ‘Dissenters’ of extremism’’
(Kaledin et al., 2007).
The local press in Tol’iatti and neighboring Samara, the regional capital, more-
over, gave overwhelmingly negative coverage of the strike, calling it a failure, giving
predominantly the company line and casting Zolotarev and Edinstvo in a negative
light that seemed designed to support the charge of extremism levied by the
authorities (Romanenko, 2007). They also cast the strike as explicitly against Edinaia
Rossiia, the ruling political party (Krylov, 2007). Although former Edinstvo leader
Anatolii Ivanov is a member of Edinaia Rossiia, the union in its current form is seen
as closer to the local leaders of Spraveledivaia Rossiia (Just Russia), a competing
Kremlin-backed political party (Aleksandrova et al., 2007).
Red Riding Hood
On 27 March 2008, an entire shift at the Krasnaia Shapochka (Red Riding Hood)
bauxite mine e 123 miners e descended into the mine and refused to return to the
surface, remaining at a depth of 500 m and demanding a 40% pay rise, improved
working conditions and investment to prolong the life of the mining region. The strike
was supported by the Nezavisimyi Profsoiuz Gorniakov Rossii (Independent Union of
Miners of Russia), led by local leader Valerii Zolotarev. V. Zolotarev himself imme-
diately joined the hunger strike, and on 28 March, the strikers were joined by the
workers of the remaining two shifts at the mine, which is the largest in the important
Severouralskii bauxuite mining region (SUBR), owned by Rusal. The same day, to
prevent the strike from spreading to other mines, Rusal stopped all work at all of its
mines in the region (Korotkikh, 2008a). In another move evidentlymeant to keep news
from spreading, the local newspaper in Severouralsk, Nashe Slovo, was prohibited
from covering the strike by the local authorities (Mingaleva, 2008).
On April 4, the miners returned to the surface, having been promised concessions
by the company. They quickly realized, however, that the promises had been a ruse
devised to end the strike and, while they could not descend back into the mine, some
of workers continued with the hunger strike.
To outside observers the strike seemed unexpected, although the stage had been
set as early as summer 2007. On 14 August 2007, Zolotarev ﬁled suit against Rusal
for ceasing the transfer of member workers’ union dues to the union’s account. The
union also accused management of harassing workers into doing extra shifts on two
to three Saturdays a month in order to increase production, and in general of
backing out of an agreement reached between the union and Sual e the mine’s
former owner e after a successful strike in October 2003, citing lowered salaries and
worsening working conditions (Uralpolit, 2007).
Regional Duma Deputy Evgenii Artiukh, a member of the Spraveledivaia Rossiia
party and a long-time friend of the independent union at SUBR, likewise attackedRusal
for refusing to consider pay increases, saying thatRusalwas, in essence, backing oﬀ from
promises made earlier by Sual and wondering why, if Sual could oﬀer increased pay,
Rusal could not. There had been a growing degree of social tension at themine ever since
Rusal acquired Sual and took control of the enterprise (Amurpolit, 2008). Rusal had
been hit by other strikes as well, including a strike in February at the Krasnoyarsk
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Aluminum Plant. Across the company and at SUBR in particular, workers have been
complaining of decreased ‘social responsibility’, including cancellation of summer
camps and other social programs for workers and their families, as well as lowered
salaries, even as the company’s proﬁts hit record highs (Korotkikh, 2008b, c).
Transport and public sector strikes
Alongside the strikes in foreign- and Russian-owned private sector ﬁrms has been
the emergence of a new round of strikes in the public sector. As noted above, budget
workers (biudzhetniki) had been a major element of the strikes in the 1990s, given the
widespread crisis in the budget sector in that period and the failure of the state under
Yeltsin to live up to its obligations. More generally though, public sector workers
play an important role in labor movements throughout the world and in the
advanced industrial economies of the OECD in particular. At a time when levels of
union membership in the private sector have been falling in the richer countries due
to the pressures of globalization and anti-union legislation, unionization rates, and
the propensity to militancy, have remained high amongst public sector workers.
Prominent in the latest strike wave are transportation workers. The most high
proﬁle action began on April 28, 2008, when members of the Profsoiuz lokomo-
tivnykh brigad zheleznodorozhnikov (Union of the Locomotive Brigades of Railroad
Workers) held a day-long wildcat strike, involving some 100 rail workers on two
suburban Moscow commuter train lines, severely disrupting operations. The union is
part of Sotsprof and held the strike despite the fact that federal law bans rail strikes.
Workers demanded a more equal pay scale, bringing salaries up to the higher end of
the current R40,000e60,000 range, and the return of seniority bonuses that were
cancelled in April 2007. FNPR responded by claiming to be making the same
demands but called the strike a public relations action by the independent union to
try to attract members (Kozenko and Mironenko, 2008).
The Moscow train workers are just part of a broader group of transport workers
who have recently been on strike. The list includes the dockworkers of the St.
Petersburg port, truck drivers and trolley bus drivers in Astrakhan, and bus drivers
in Perm’. Once again, this phenomenon echoes both the previous history of the labor
movement in post-Communist Russia, and the experience of labor internationally.
Transportation workers throughout the world have been quite eﬀective in using their
strategic location as a way to exercise leverage over both their employers and the
state. Moreover, transport workers, notably dockers and air-traﬃc controllers, were
amongst the few groups of workers in Russia in the 1990s that were able to build
independent unions and organize themselves eﬀectively. Consequently, workers in
transportation have also been targeted by the state for retaliation and strikes have
been ruled illegal on both the railroads and in air-traﬃc control.
Failing enterprises
There are also, however, still some elements of the strike wave that resemble
the kinds of problems that aﬄicted Russian workers in the 1990s, including
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non-payment of wages and hunger strikes. However, as the examples in this section
show, these tend to be localized phenomena related to failing enterprises (or
fraudulent management) rather than a systemic feature of the economic system.
Nevertheless, it is clear that hunger strikes remain an important part of the repertoire
of protest for Russian workers.
Recent examples include 125 workers from the Visherskaia Paper Company
(VBK) in Krasnovishersk in Permskii Krai, who undertook a hunger strike in
February 2008, claiming R10 million owed to them by the company that went
bankrupt on 12 February of that year with more than R400 million in debts
(Konfederatsiia Truda Rossii, 2008). The hunger strike ended when the workers were
sued by the city administration for illegally occupying the building in which their
protest was taking place. In another case, on April 4, 2007 17 vendors in Komso-
molsk-na-Amure announced a hunger strike in protest against the closing of the city
market in which they rented space (Kommersant, 2007). Similarly, on April 8, 23
employees of the Captain’s Club restaurant in Krasnoyarsk occupied the restaurant
demanding the payment of wage arrears of up to 5 months. 6 of the employees
announced that they were going on hunger strike in protest at the management’s
alleged oﬀer to pay back wages in kind rather than money (NGS Novosti, 2008).
The reemergence of the alternative unions
A key element in the new strike wave is the new lease on life the strikes have given
to alternative union confederations that emerged in the 1990s but that struggled
under Yeltsin and in the early Putin years. As these cases show, over the last few
years we have seen the reemergence of a range of alternative unions including
Edinstvo, the liberal union confederation Sotsprof, the Trotskyite union Zashchita
Truda, the KPRFeallied Konfederatsiia Truda Rossii (Confederation of Labor of
Russia) and the Vserossiiskaia Konfederatsiia Truda (All-Russian Confederation of
Labor). The apparent revival of these unions comes from the same source that
rendered them weak in the 1990s: the alternative unions have to grow from the
ground up. Unlike the FNPR, these are unions of activists built from below, uniting
and organizing groups of militant workers, in response to locally based actions at the
level of the enterprise, or even of one shop within an enterprise. In the stronger
economy of recent years, with companies growing and keen to continue production,
such actions are more possible than they were in the context of the 1990s economic
collapse. Unlike the FNPR, for these unions the experience of struggle and the
creation of organization at the local level generally predated the involvement of the
national confederations.
Nevertheless, in many cases the confederations play a useful role, ranging from
moral support in Severouralsk and Vsevolozhsk, to being a key resource in Surgut
and Tol’iatti, and serving as the primary ‘locomotive’ of the Moscow rail strike. In
the Surgut case, for example, Sotsprof’s network of activists proved crucial to
expanding the unrest beyond Surgut itself, to Liantor, Megion and other oil towns.
Likewise, connections through Sotsprof helped labor leaders at Ford and AvtoVAZ
come together with their colleagues at Avtoframos and Nokian Tires to form the
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Inter-regional Union of Automotive Workers in order to oﬀer mutual support and
coordinate demands (Mekhanik and Kvasov, 2007).
Indeed, the alternative union locals are quite explicit about their organizational
ties. Thus, the website of the Ford union includes links to the Edinstvo union at
AvtoVAZ, the Profsvoboda union at Surgut, the Profsoiuz lokomotivnykh brigad
zheleznodorozhnikov that organized the wildcat rail strike in Moscow, and others in
Arzamas, Tomsk, Belgorod and elsewhere around Russia. There is, needless to say,
no link to the FNPR (http://www.ford-profsoyuz.ru/. Accessed 1 October 2008). The
banner atop the Edinstvo website includes, alongside Edinstvo’s own logo, the logos
of the Ford union, the independent union at the GM-AvtoVAZ joint venture, an
independent rail union in Syzran’ and the Transnationals Information Exchange that
was key to spurring the initial strike at Ford (Mekhanik and Kvasov, 2007).
On the one hand, these linkages serve quite concrete purposes, providing local
unions e which are, in almost all cases, the instigators of strikes and protests e with
resources and expertise, as well as with conduits for sharing information. It was
thanks to the relationships subsumed under the Sotsprof and MPRA umbrellas that
workers at other factories and in other regions were able to join the picket line at
Ford, for example. And Sotsprof is a major source of the information that the local
unions distribute to their members, concerning labor laws and market developments
in particular.
But on the other hand, there is also a perceptual role played by these linkages. For
example, Sotsprof leader Sergei Khramov is frequently quoted in articles about
strikes, playing up the importance of his organization. And Khramov is abetted in
that eﬀort by the striking unions’ opponents, whether management, FNPR local
leaders or even the local authorities, who generally seek to portray local conﬂicts as
being artiﬁcially engineered from the outside by ‘radical’ forces such as Sotsprof.
Both sides exaggerate the role of Sotsprof in these strikes. Nonetheless, the presence
even of a low level of interaction, combined with the rhetorical importance of Sot-
sprof and demonstrations of solidarity by workers in other places allows striking
workers to perceive themselves as part of a movement and it is clear that the idea of
a growing labor movement is held not only by the workers, but by journalists,
analysts and other opinion leaders, as evidenced by many of the news reports cited in
this article, in which the strikes and protests discussed here are seen in the context of
one another.
The FNPR
The perception of a growing independent labor movement has had an impact on
the FNPR as well. In its role as a virtual or ersatz union meant to displace labor
mobilization while precluding the need for the state and employers to engage in true
tri-partite negotiations, the FNPR faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it cannot
tolerate the appearance of signiﬁcant non-FNPR mobilization: such mobilization
would pull down the fac¸ade of legitimacy that FNPR claims, while simultaneously
demonstrating the organization’s failure at its mission of marginalizing the alter-
native unions. On the other hand, the FNPR cannot absorb and assimilate truly
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grassroots mobilization into its own structures, which are designed to dissipate
rather than transmit grievances. Any attempt to bring true grievances on board
could either lead to an organizational split or force the organization to break its
relationship with the state.
To cope, the FNPR seems to have developed a three-fold strategy of reaction. The
ﬁrst element is to continually malign and marginalize independent unions. For
example, it paints Sotsprof and its local aﬃliates as ‘radicals’ and ‘extremists’ and
alleges that strikes and protests are being engineered as political ploys to garner
electoral support for one party or another, or simply to provide ‘PR’ for Sotsprof
while feeding the ‘personal ambitions’ of Sergei Khramov, Aleksei Etmanov and
other labor leaders (what those ‘personal ambitions’ might be is generally left up to
the reader’s imagination). The second element is to pursue ‘‘safe’’ forms of militancy,
bringing workers out into the streets to demand more corporate social responsibility,
increased pensions and the like, but generally without reference to speciﬁc grievances
and almost exclusively without work stoppages. To underscore the benign nature of
such ‘mobilization’, FNPR often marches together with Edinaia Rossiia loyalists and
formulates its demands to mesh with the party’s own rhetoric. Thus, in April 2007,
when FNPR organized a nationwide ‘day of protest’ to demand higher pensions, it
came hand in hand with an announcement by Edinaia Rossiia that the party would
seek to push a pension increase through the Duma.
The third element of FNPR’s strategy has been to reconsolidate its ties with the
state and employers. The relationship with the ruling Edinaia Rossiia party has
already been mentioned, and while Edinaia Rossiia leaders studiously avoid
involvement in speciﬁc labor disputes, they have not hesitated to requite the rela-
tionship in general, marching through central Moscow on May Day 2008 with some
20,000 people gathered by the party and the FNPR (Stepin, 2008). In addition, the
FNPR’s frequently and loudly repeated accusations of ‘extremism’ have ﬁt easily
into the ‘anti-extremist’ frame of the law enforcement apparatus, and local labor
activists have found themselves facing criminal charges of extremism in several of the
cases described here. And, although Ford and AvtoVAZ have dealt with the inde-
pendent unions, all of the employers cited here except Ford have also duly noted
FNPR’s loyalty, seeking generally to distribute whatever concessions are made
through FNPR channels and reiterating their position of dealing only with the
FNPR-aﬃliated locals.
Regime response
The strike wave of 2006e2008 represents a challenge both economically and
politically. While it is not possible at this stage to estimate the economic eﬀects of the
wave, and while they will have in any case been obscured by the global economic
downturn that began in 2008, it is clear that Russia could ill aﬀord wage costs to rise
signiﬁcantly at a time when inﬂationary pressures were already threatening to take
the shine of recent economic performance. Adding wage-cost pressure to high and
rising international commodity prices and growing government spending could have
created a dangerous mixture.
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Politically, too, the strike wave has potentially threatening implications for the
current regime. The power of example is strong. Russian and international experi-
ence demonstrates that strikes can become very contagious indeed if it becomes
apparent that taking industrial action is eﬀective. If this happens, the strike wave
could change from being largely a problem for employers to being one for the state.
Furthermore, the example of workers making progress by organizing and protesting
outside of state-sanctioned structures is unlikely to be lost on others dissatisﬁed with
the narrow politics of Putin’s Russia. As a result, the Kremlin is unlikely to want to
create the impression that it can be forced into making compromises by action in
factories and on the streets.
Furthermore, the Kremlin is increasingly caught in a dilemma of its own creation.
Two new problems seem to emerge from these cases that we have not seen before and
that can be traced back to the state. One of these is that much of the protest can be
seen as a direct response to the regime, and the socially-oriented rhetoric the ruling
group employs. Thus, when workers at AvtoVAZ demanded salaries of 25,000 rubles
per month, they were directly reminding their state-controlled bosses e all of whom
are members of the ruling party e of a Edinaia Rossiia campaign promise. Similar
references to Edinaia Rossiia campaign promises were reportedly made in the rail-
road strike. This sort of appeal seems particularly resonant against the backdrop of
political-economy developments during Putin’s second term, which saw increasing
industrial consolidation and growing state or state-linked ownership of major
industrial assets. It is not, for example, a tremendous leap for workers at AvtoVAZ
or the Russian railroads to demand that their state-owned employers live up to the
promises of the political elite, even if the companies are formally ‘private’ and
autonomous.
The second problem, closely related to the ﬁrst, is workers’ evidently declining
perceptions of ‘social responsibility’, that is, the degree to which they are taken care
of by larger institutions, both employers and the state. A similar logic to that
described in the preceding paragraph applies in the area of social responsibility,
a recurring theme in Edinaia Rossiia rhetoric and in Vladimir Putin’s annual ‘state of
the nation’ addresses as president, and in much of his rhetoric as prime minister.
Having heard the state tout the importance of social responsibility, and having seen
some companies, at least for a time, increase their standards, perceived decreases in
social responsibility are also leading to strikes. Thus, in both Surgut and Sever-
ouralsk workers struck in response to what they saw as the failure of their employers
to live up to promises. Those promises need not be explicit or direct. In Severouralsk,
Rusal was accused of backing away from promises made by Sual, the previous owner
of the Krasnaia Shapochka mine; in Surgut, meanwhile, SNG had been generally
inconsistent in its ‘social component’, and in any case was perceived as failing to live
up to the standards set earlier by Yukos. And at Ford, workers demanded that their
foreign-owned employer exceed Russian standards of behavior e which the workers
recognized as being low e and treat them no diﬀerently than if they had been
workers in Germany or the United States.
While all of the strikes reviewed in this article are primarily local phenomena, the
appearance of these new problems points to a nascent generalization of grievances
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from the particular to the universal. While workers in the 1990s struck out of
desperation, workers in Putin’s second term strike out of a sense of entitlement. As
workers in an increasingly prosperous and ostensibly socially responsible Russia,
they demand more than just a job and a wage: they demand a good job and
a competitive wage. Certainly, an improving market allows them to do this, and
labor militancy generally increases along with economic prosperity. But citing an
exclusively structural and economic logic obscures the fact that the workers in these
cases seem to act not simply on an opportunity, but on a sense of justice that is
enabled by, but eventually transcends, the economic context.
The initial, if somewhat tentative, move from particular to universal grievance e
informed by the increasing coherence of the independent labor movement, the
retrenchment of the FNPR and the emergence of new, contextual problems e feeds
into a much more fundamental shift in the development of independent labor as
a social movement. The sense of injury engendered by the failure of the state and
employers to live up to rhetorical obligations, combined with clearly identiﬁable
‘culprits’, provides the basic building blocks for an injustice frame. The belligerent
response of the movement’s opponents, including the FNPR, employers and the
state, who increasingly act in concert, serves only to strengthen the perceived
injustice, further entrenching workers’ local concerns in the context of generalized
dissent. Moreover, the refusal of ‘oﬃcial’ political organizations, such as FNPR or
Edinaia Rossiia, to take workers’ concerns on board and transmit them to the pol-
icymaking arena, indeed the general inaccessibility of the state itself, forces disaf-
fected workers into alliances with the Communist Party and other opposition
groups, regardless of any prior views workers may have held about the regime and its
leadership.
It is worth noting here that many of the strikes, like most ‘wildcat actions’, have
their roots in long-held grievances, often going back one or more years prior to the
development of actual unrest. But just as the recalcitrance of the FNPR forces
disgruntled workers towards the independent unions, these simmering grievances are
not transmitted through Russia’s monopolized and atrophied media and civil-soci-
etal infrastructure. As a result, strikes seem to an outside observer to arise ‘out of the
blue’, unexpected blips against a backdrop of general social peace. To an insider,
however, they would appear as logical and easily understandable reactions to an
untenable situation. Thus, the ease with which workers across industries and regions
have begun to show solidarity with one another, as well as the quick ‘contagion’
eﬀect of copycat strikes, again both on a regional and an industrial basis. All of this
means that the apparent stability of Putin’s ‘‘managed society’’, built as it is on top-
down organizations, is extremely fragile.
Workers’ shifting perception of the means and ends of labor unrest inevitably
reﬂects back on their perception of organized labor itself. In a remarkable anecdote,
Ford labor leader Aleksei Etmanov told of his own changing perceptions after his
visit to Brazil:
Last spring they sent me on a two-week trip to an international labor
conference in Brazil. On heading oﬀ, I was sure that all a union meant was
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a Christmas present for the employees and a collective booze-up once a year.
After the trip I understood; the union doesn’t give anything, a union ﬁghts.
Recognizing ‘‘the low level of consciousness’’ of most workers and the fact that
the collective is not used to ﬁghting for its rights, I decided to copy the example
of my Brazilian colleagues and hold seminars explaining the correct way to
declare a strike, explaining what a collective agreement is, and what basic rights
are guaranteed by labor legislation. It is not a secret to anyone e the more
a welder knows, the more he is worth. We would like to free ourselves from the
‘‘vertical’’ of the FNPR, because so far we have received no support from
them. We are going to ﬁght for our rights by uniting the trade unions of the
region (Rossiia, 2006).
In a separate interview, he added:
In Brazil, it is not just drivers, but also metal workers who participate in
protest actions. Therefore, they more quickly achieve increases in wages that
are struggling to keep up with inﬂation. What is most important there is that,
despite unemployment, casual laborers do not mess things up for the strikers,
because there solidarity is not an empty word, but is real (Loshchikhina, 2006).
Thus, for Etmanov, the revelation of the possibilities of labor mobilization helped
him re-frame the diﬃculties he perceived in Russia. It did not take him long to
convince his co-workers to look in the same direction. And, for an evidently growing
number of Russian workers, a similar shift in perception may be increasingly easy to
make e even without a trip to Brazil. If so, the implications for the Putin-era
political system could be serious indeed.
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